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CHINESE CURRENCY MANIPULATION: ARE THERE ANY
SOLUTIONS?
Politicians often bellow about currency manipulation in an attempt to prove
their toughness on foreign policy.1 All too often these politicians seem underinformed about the subject.2 In recent years, a substantial amount of political
rhetoric in the United States has been aimed at addressing the “problem” of
Chinese currency manipulation.3 Upon investigation, all of the proposed
solutions prove inadequate, whether they call for greater cooperation with
multi-national organizations, unilateral actions, or simple diplomacy.4
The majority of the discussion on this subject is based on the assumption
that China is manipulating its currency, that this manipulation is a problem,
and that the United States has a number of options available to address this
problem.5 This Comment challenges all of those assumptions. First, whether or
not China is manipulating its currency is debatable; additionally, many other
countries are acting similarly, and this seems to be the norm rather than the
exception. Second, the “problem” has less to do with China and the United
States and more to do with general inefficiency in global trade. Third, even if
Chinese currency manipulation is a problem, the current international
framework is inadequate to handle it. Fourth, any bilateral or unilateral actions
taken by the United States would either: 1) be ineffective or 2) cause more
harm than good.
1 See, e.g., James Bacchus, What A Trade War With China Would Look Like, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/31/trade-wto-china-opinions-contributors_0202_james_bacchus.html;
Ezra
Klein, Five Facts You Need to Know About China’s Currency Manipulation, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Oct.
22, 2012, 11:11 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/10/22/five-facts-you-needto-know-about-chinas-currency-manipulation/; Matthew O’Brien, Romney’s China-Bashing Is 100%
Correct . . . But 5 Years Late, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2012, 10:16 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2012/10/romneys-china-bashing-is-100-correct-but-5-years-late/264011/.
2 See Klein, supra note 1; O’Brien, supra note 1; Arvind Subramanian & Martin Kessler, China’s
Currency Rises in the US Backyard, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2012, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5a34c410-19d611e2-a379-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2BAZ6caYA.
3 See Bacchus, supra note 1; Press Release, S. Comm. on Fin., Hatch-Calls on Obama Administration to
Outline Position on China Currency Manipulation (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/
ranking/release/?id=2fc3a886-e940-475c-91ee-48861fa338b0.
4 See, e.g., Bacchus, supra note 1 (explaining that there might be a better course of action to resolve the
currency manipulation issue than “through quiet bilateral diplomacy with China”).
5 See Douglas A. Irwin, Esprit de Currency, FIN. & DEV., June 2011, at 30, 32–33 (describing the
potential consequences of currency manipulation, the actions taken by the United States and Europe to address
the problem, and a possible solution).
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This Comment proposes that there may not be any adequate solutions to the
issue. If an adequate solution exists, it would likely come by means of a new
global consensus and international convention, not by any existing
mechanisms. Lastly, the problem with Chinese currency manipulation is not
the devaluation of currency by China, but the regulatory regimes that enable it.
Part I of this Comment provides historical background, describing the
history of exchange rate regulation and the current regulatory environment.
Part II of the Comment describes the current currency manipulation by China
in depth.6 Part III illustrates the inadequacies of the current avenues for
multilateral solutions, including mechanisms provided by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as
other bilateral solutions. Part IV examines the different actions (or inaction)
that the United States could take unilaterally. Part V discusses the benefits and
feasibility of reaching an international consensus on the issue. Part VI proposes
that this problem may actually correct itself in the medium or long term.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Basics of Currency Manipulation
Currency manipulation occurs when a country artificially inflates or
deflates its exchange rate.7 According to the Peterson Institute for International
Economics (IIE), currency manipulation is “when a government buys or sells
foreign currency to push the exchange rate of its currency away from its
equilibrium value or to prevent the exchange rate from moving toward its
equilibrium value.”8 One way a country can devalue its currency is to print
more money,9 and then use that new money to buy foreign debt and foreign
currency.10 This increases the supply of the currency in the country printing

6 China has taken a number of different policy stances toward its currency. See TRADE L. ADVISORY
GRP., CHINA’S POLICY OF SUBSTANTIALLY UNDERVALUING THE RENMINBI: A CHALLENGE FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND TRADING SYSTEM 43, 46 (2008) [hereinafter TLAG] (discussing China’s
four exchange-rate phases since Mao Zedong’s policies of economic isolation).
7 See id. at 22.
8 JOSEPH E. GAGNON, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., POLICY BRIEF No. PB12-19, COMBATING
WIDESPREAD CURRENCY MANIPULATION 1 (2012).
9 See Tejvan Pettinger, The Problem With Printing Money, ECON. HELP BLOG (Aug. 7, 2012, 11:57
AM), http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/634/economics/the-problem-with-printing-money.
10 See, e.g., Brian Palmer, If Currency Manipulation Is So Great for Exports, Why Don’t We Do It?,
SLATE (Oct. 17, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/10/china_
currency_manipulation_how_does_it_harm_the_u_s_and_what_can_we_do.single.html. Because the value of
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money, which lowers the value of its currency. In turn, it decreases the supply
of the target country’s currency, which increases the value of its currency.11
Countries may manipulate their currency for a number of reasons: to boost
currency account surpluses,12 for political gain,13 to avoid inflation,14 to make
exports more competitive,15 or to reduce the inflow of capital into their
country.16 Currency manipulation often causes many harmful effects,17 both to
the domestic manufacturing industries of the non-manipulating countries and,
on a larger scale, to the overall amount of world trade.18
Although research has been contradictory,19 a few commonly held
assumptions exist concerning currency manipulation and its effect on trade.
When a country’s currency depreciates relative to other currencies, its exports
become cheaper to importing countries, at least in the short term.20 Conversely,
currency is no longer tied to a commodity (like gold), countries are able to print as much currency as they
desire. Id. Printing money does however bring certain risks, such as inflation. Pettinger, supra note 9.
11 See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 10 (“[T]he [Chinese] government constantly prints new currency and uses
it to buy U.S. dollars and U.S. government debt, thereby flooding the market with Chinese currency and
increasing demand for American dollars.”).
12 GAGNON, supra note 8, at 2. When a country is doing well economically, its citizens are spending
more. OLIVIER BLANCHARD & GIAN MARIA MILESI-FERRETTI, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND [IMF],
(WHY) SHOULD CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES BE REDUCED? 6 (2011). Typically, this increased spending is
more than the domestic production of the country can handle, so consumption of imports increases When a
country has more imports than exports, it creates a currency account deficit where more of its currency is in
foreign countries than foreign currencies are in its own borders. See BLANCHARD, supra, at 9. Countries with
high currency account surpluses are saving more than they are spending. See id. The problem with countries
maintaining large current account surpluses is that, in theory, it suppresses global demand and causes problems
with international trade, all for the benefit of the country amassing this surplus. See id. at 8–10.
13 See GAGNON, supra note 8, at 2.
14 If a country takes actions to reduce its money supply, the demand for the currency goes up, bringing
the value of the currency with it. See Palmer, supra note 10.
15 O’Brien, supra note 1.
16 Id.
17 See Jeffrey S. Beckington & Matthew R. Amon, Competitive Currency Depreciation: The Need for a
More Effective International Legal Regime, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 209, 209 (2011) (“Such ‘beggar-thyneighbor’ gains, however, are contrary to the basic international goal of achieving efficient markets for the
general welfare.”).
18 See id. at 209, 217–18; cf. Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Currency Undervaluation and
Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade Organization 4 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ.
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-2, 2008), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/
wp08-2.pdf (“[B]etween China and the oil-exporting countries, moving toward more appropriate levels of
exchange rates could have increased world trade by about half a trillion dollars.”).
19 Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon & Jane Korinek, To What Extent Do Exchange Rates and Their Volatility
Affect Trade? 4, 9 (Trade & Agric. Directorate Trade Comm., Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Working Paper
No. 119, 2011), available at http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/TC/
WP(2010)21/FINAL&docLanguage=En.
20 Id. at 7–8.
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it makes its imports relatively more expensive.21 When domestic goods are
more expensive than the imports flooding in, domestic manufacturing suffers.22
B. History of Currency Manipulation
The dangers of currency manipulation show prominently in the lessons
learned from the 1920s and 1930s.23 In fact, currency manipulation played an
important role in ushering in the Great Depression, as nationalistic currency
wars increased the rapid descent of an already weak global economy.24 One
after another, countries started to devalue their currency in an attempt to boost
their exports and rescue their floundering economies.25 This ignited a “race to
the bottom,” where one country’s devaluation of their currency, an attempt to
boost their exports in the short term, caused another country to respond in
kind.26 This competitive devaluation resulted in different manufacturing
industries being ruined, as the market for imports and exports was effectively
broken.27
Countries believed that they had a sovereign right to value their currency
however they decided to meet their economic agenda.28 Countries then took
corrective actions against undervalued imports to protect their domestic
manufacturing, while at the same time propping up their own exports through
the very process that prompted their own protectionist conduct.29 Competitive
devaluation led to rampant inflation, and the results proved to be disastrous.30
Even while this competitive devaluation was occurring, at least a few
researchers began to realize its negative effects. This emerging consciousness
prompted the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to examine the possible
solutions to exchange rate manipulation.31 The FTC did not endorse any
particular solution, simply noting that “[d]umping has been repeatedly
recognized as unfair competition in national legislation and in international
21

See id.
See TLAG, supra note 6, at 39–40.
23 See generally Beckington & Amon, supra note 17, at 211–17.
24 Id. at 211.
25 See id. at 213.
26 Id.
27 See id.
28 Id.
29 See id.
30 Id.
31 See FED. TRADE COMM’N., ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION AND OTHER IMPORT REGULATIONS
UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, S. DOC. NO. 73-112 (1934).
22

IN THE
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conferences and agreements, although it is sometimes very difficult to draw the
line between what is fair and what is unfair in foreign-trade development.”32
Even in the face of such research, an economic catastrophe like the Great
Depression and World War II was necessary to induce reformation.
After World War II, the international community decided to prevent this
madness—rampant inflation caused by competitive currency devaluation—
from happening again.33 At the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, the major
powers created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.34
Three years later, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)35 was
finalized, indicating a shift from laissez faire economics to a regulatory regime
designed to prevent the race to the bottom, which hastened the economic
collapse of the Great Depression.36 This was the first time that an international
organization purported to regulate inter-state monetary affairs.37 Prior to the
formation of this regime, inter-state monetary affairs were either handled by
bilateral agreements between countries, or not at all.38
To achieve this goal, the IMF was charged with overseeing the
international monetary system, which is “the system of exchange rates and
international payments” that facilitates commerce between countries.39 The
IMF “ensure[s] exchange rate stability and encourage[s] its member countries
to eliminate exchange restrictions that hinder[] trade.”40 Initially, the IMF
pegged exchange rates to be measured by a standard par-value based on the
value of gold.41 Members could change the par-value of their currency, but
only to correct a fundamental disequilibrium.42 The IMF Articles of Agreement

32

Id. at 2.
Beckington & Amon, supra note 17, at 211.
34 Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, President of the Conference, Closing Address to the
Bretton Woods Conference (July 22, 1944).
35 General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 6 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
“GATT”].
36 Beckington & Amon, supra note 17, at 210.
37 See id. at 211–12.
38 Id. Currency regulation was seen as intricately interwoven in a country’s sovereignty. Id.
39 What the IMF Does, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/adm/rec/what/whatimf.
htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
40 Cooperation and Reconstruction (1944–71), INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/
about/histcoop.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
41 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. 4(1), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2
U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement].
42 Id. art. 4(v).
33
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do not define fundamental disequilibrium, and the IMF has never defined a
standard for it.43
This system worked well, and the next three decades were prosperous.44
Unfortunately, the stability of exchange rates would end in the late 1960s.45
Countries began to desire more flexibility and sovereignty over their
currencies, and by 1971, the gold standard system had completely fallen
apart.46 In 1971, the IMF’s Board of Governors agreed on an amendment to the
Articles of Agreement effectively recognizing that the gold standard system
was no longer in force.47 This amendment allowed IMF members to set their
exchange rates as they saw proper.48 Exchange-rate policies were still subject
to IMF review and had to conform with the IMF Articles of Agreement, but
stable exchange rates were no longer the standard.49
When currencies are not pegged to a standard, problems arise. When two
countries both exercise their sovereign right to set a bilateral exchange rate
between their two currencies, they may arrive at two different values.50 One
country might say that their exchange rate is two to one, whereas another
country might put it at three to one. Because of the incentive to manipulate
these ratios, to boost exports or to increase current accounts, market distortions
likely result. One particular instance where manipulation seems to be causing
market distortion is in China, a problem that is discussed in the next section.
II. THE “PROBLEM”
A. China’s Undervalued Currency
Politicians often decry currency manipulation in campaign speeches,
congressional committee meetings, and debates to prove to constituents that
they will be tough on countries trying to cheat the free market.51 The media has

43

Beckington & Amon, supra note 17, at 236.
Id.
45 Id. at 237.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 240–41 (discussing a hypothetical example between China and the United States).
51 See, e.g., Press Release, Hatch Calls on Obama Adm. to Outline Position on China Currency
Manipulation (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=2fc3a886-e940475c-91ee-48861fa338b0 [hereinafter Hatch Press Release]; Transcript and Audio: Third Presidential Debate,
44
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given particular prominence in recent years to China’s currency manipulation,
which began concurrently with China’s admission to the WTO.52 At different
times, China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB),53 has seen many different policy
regimes; it has been pegged to the dollar, allowed to float, and intentionally
devalued by the Chinese government.54 Through all of that oscillation, the net
result is that the Chinese currency has been, and currently still is, undervalued
against the dollar compared to what it would be if left to market forces.55 The
years 2000 to 2010 saw China accumulating currency account surpluses of
$1.8 trillion, while the United States accumulated global trade deficits of $7.6
trillion.56 While a significant amount of those trade imbalances are likely due
to China’s economy growing rapidly and the United States acting as a
“consumer of last resort,”57 currency manipulation has likely played a role.
Currency manipulation has serious effects on the global market. Around the
globe, currency manipulation is possibly responsible for millions of jobs lost in
the United States and a smaller, but still significant, number of jobs lost in
Europe.58 A large volume of literature illustrates the issue, particularly with
respect to China manipulating its currency in the past, as well as in the frame
of the current international economic environment.59 Scholars have proposed
several solutions. Some have argued that new international institutions are

NPR (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/22/163436694/transcript-3rd-obama-romney-presidentialdebate.
52 O’Brien, supra note 1.
53 Sometimes also referred to as yuan, which is the name of a unit of the renminbi currency. Stephen
Mulvey, Why China’s Currency Has Two Names, BBC NEWS (June 26, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
10413076.
54 From 1995 to 2005, China pegged its currency, holding it steady at slightly over eight RMB to the
dollar. China pegged its currency to the dollar between 1995 and 2005, holding it at an exchange rate of
roughly eight RMB to the dollar. Edward P. Lazear, Chinese ‘Currency Manipulation’ Is Not the Problem,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732332040457821320358123
1448.html. Then, in late 2005, China allowed its currency to appreciate relative to the dollar until July 2008.
From late 2005 to July 2008, China let its currency rise in value relative to the dollar. Id. For nearly two years,
the rate held steady. Id. The currency began to gradually appreciate again in 2010. Id. Now at 6.2 RMB per
dollar, one RMB is worth about 16 cents. Id.
55 See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., POLICY
BRIEF NO. PB12-19, WILL THE WTO ENJOY A BRIGHT FUTURE? 11 (2012).
56 Id.
57 See Don Lee, U.S. Once Again Cast as World’s Consumer of Last Resort, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/19/business/la-fi-global-economy-20100620 .
58 GAGNON, supra note 8, at 1; see Evaluating China’s Past and Future Role in the World Trade
Organization: Hearing Before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 110th Cong. 64
(2010) (prepared statement of Thea Lee, Deputy Chief of Staff, AFL-CIO).
59 See, e.g., Irwin, supra note 5.
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necessary to solve the problems associated with currency manipulation.60
Others have argued that China has consciously and flamboyantly disregarded
the WTO, rendering any relief through that body unlikely and possibly
threatening the overall legitimacy of the WTO.61 Some have argued that the
United States must act unilaterally to put pressure on China due to the lack of
effective multilateral resolutions.62 With such a wide array of views on the
issue, the only common theme is that China manipulating its currency is a
problem that demands a remedy.
B. Other Manipulators
China has received a great amount of attention for its exchange-rate
policies,63 but China is not the only state engaging in such policies.64
Switzerland, for instance, has pegged the franc to the euro, artificially lowering
its currency.65 Switzerland, however, has seemingly “less objectionable”
motives,66 as its policy was instituted to halt the franc buying frenzy driven by
investors nervous about the Euro crisis.67
Of twenty countries that the IIE found manipulating their currencies,68
Denmark, Hong Kong, Israel, and Japan are also on the list.69 All of the

60

See, e.g., Beckington & Amon, supra note 17, at 267.
Dan Harris, Another China WTO Loss. Another Nail in the Coffin of World Trade, CHINA L. BLOG
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2012/02/another_china_wto_loss_another_nail_in_the_coffin_
of_world_trade.html.
62 See Evaluating China’s Past and Future Role in the World Trade Organization: Hearing Before the
U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 110th Cong. 21 (2010) (statement of Sen. Charles
Schumer).
63 See Brian Scarfe, China’s Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy and the Global Economy, E. ASIA F.
(Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/15/china-s-monetary-and-exchange-rate-policy-andthe-global-economy/ (“The rest of the world . . . knows that China’s [monetary and exchange rate] policy is
perverse from an external balance perspective.”).
64 See GAGNON, supra note 8, at 1, 7.
65 Josh Barro, Switzerland: The Other Currency Manipulator, BLOOMBERG: THE TICKER (Oct. 23, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-23/switzerland-the-other-currency-manipulator.html.
66 Whether motives are objectionable depends on the frame of reference. From the standpoint of the
country undervaluing its currency, all it is doing is helping to support its export industry. From the perspective
of the countries suffering the negative externalities from this undervaluation, the undervalued currency is
unfair manipulation.
67 See Daniel Gros, An Overlooked Currency War in Europe, VOX (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.voxeu.
org/article/overlooked-currency-war-europe.
68 GAGNON, supra note 8, at 7 tbl.1.
69 The list includes eight “Advanced economies:” Denmark, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Korea, Singapore,
Switzerland, and Taiwan. Others listed include: Argentina, Bolivia, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand,
Angola, Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. Id.
61
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countries on the list satisfy four criteria. First, they “must have foreign
exchange reserves that are greater than the value of six months of goods and
services imports.”70 This factor indicates an excessive ratio of foreign reserves
to the need for such reserves. Second, “[c]ountries must have an average
current account balance (as a percent of GDP) between 2001 and 2011 that is
greater than zero.”71 This factor indicates that the country has been steadily
manipulating its currency for a while.72 Third, “[c]ountries must have
increased their reserve stocks relative to their GDP over the past 10 years.”73
Lastly, low-income countries did not make the list, as the researcher operated
under the principle that they “should have greater freedom than other countries
to pursue economic development policies that may have negative
externalities.”74
Interestingly, the IIE study, perhaps due to it being framed in relation to
U.S. dollars, does not list one of the largest currency manipulators: the United
States. Due to the Federal Reserves quantitative easing, which “prints money”
to add liquidity to the domestic market,75 the United States has drawn criticism
from the international community for its own currency manipulation.76
Currency manipulation is neither new nor isolated to one or two offending
countries. Many countries devalue their currencies and have done so
throughout history. China is the one that dominates the national media.77
However, this Comment does not propose to provide the reason for this
discrepancy. The focus of this Comment is on Chinese currency manipulation,
and a few possible solutions are presented next in Part III.
70

Id. at 6.
Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. Two countries that would have been on the IIE list if not for this requirement are Myanmar and
Nepal. Id.
75 Brad Plumer, QE3: What is Quantitative Easing? And Will it Help the Economy?, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Sept. 13, 2012, 10:52 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/09/13/
qe3-what-is-quantitative-easing-and-will-it-help-the-economy (“Since the Federal Reserve can just create
dollars out of thin air, it can buy up assets like long-term Treasuries or mortgage-backed securities from
commercial banks and other institutions.”).
76 Instead of discussion centering around Chinese currency manipulation, recent international economic
summits have been dominated by talk of the United States manipulating its own currency. See Charles V.
Archie, Comment, China Cannot Have Its Cake and Eat It Too: Coercing the PRC to Reform its Currency
Exchange Policy to Conform to its WTO Obligations, 37 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 247, 269 (2011).
77 Chinese manipulation dominates the scant media coverage of the topic in the United States. It would
be unsurprising if the Chinese media focused on how the United States undervalued the dollar via quantitative
easing.
71
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III. MULTILATERAL SOLUTIONS
Two international bodies that could have jurisdiction over currency
manipulation currently exist: the IMF and the WTO. However, neither of these
bodies, as currently constituted, are adequate. The IMF lacks any viable
enforcement mechanism, and the WTO, while it does have different complaint
mechanisms, fails to use them effectively. Because these two bodies are
continually mentioned as possible solutions for currency manipulation, this
Comment will examine each in depth.
A. IMF
1. Jurisdiction
Theoretically, currency manipulation disputes fall under the IMF’s
jurisdiction. Even though the gold standard has long been discarded, IMF
members’ exchange-rate policies are still subject to review.78 A 1977 decision
by the IMF cited three main principles regarding the policies members should
follow:
1.

2.

3.

A member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the
international monetary system in order to prevent effective
balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair
competitive advantage over other members.
A member should intervene in the exchange market if
necessary to counter disorderly conditions which may be
characterized inter alia by disruptive short-term movements
in the exchange value of its currency.
Members should take into account in their intervention
policies the interests of other members, including those of
79
the countries in whose countries they intervene.

Additionally, Article IV, Section 1 of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement
specifies that members will “avoid manipulating exchange rates or the
international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of
payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other
members.”80 In the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, a few of the purpose
statements are described as follows:
78

IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 42, art. 4(1)(iii).
IMF, Surveillance Over Exchange Rate Policies, Dec. No. 5392-(77/63) (Apr. 29, 1977), in IMF,
ANNUAL REPORT 1977 107, 108 (1977).
80 IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 42, art. 4(1)(iii).
79
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(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a
permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation
and collaboration on international monetary problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of
high levels of employment and real income and to the development of
the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of
economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange
depreciation.81
These purpose statements, read together, indicate that a significant
foundation of the IMF is the desire to facilitate free trade, which in large part
requires countries not to engage in “competitive exchange depreciation.”82
2. Enforcement
However, since the adoption of Article IV in 1978, the IMF has never
publicly declared that any nation is violating this ban on currency
manipulation.83 IMF consultations under Article IV are “supposed to occur on
an annual basis with each member. This is generally the case with the Fund’s
larger members, but frequency is somewhat less than annual with smaller
members.”84 Since ratification of Article IV, there have been tens of thousands
of Article IV consultations, but “[i]n none of these consultations has the
Executive Board ever concluded that a member was out of compliance with its
obligations regarding its exchange rate policies or any other matter!”85
Three explanations for this inaction exist. First, this inaction derives from
the inability of countries to file complaints against other countries and the lack
of any enforcement mechanisms.86 Countries are supposed to abide by the
81

Id. art. 1(i)–(iii) (describing the purposes of the IMF).
Id. art. 1(iii).
83 MICHAEL MUSSA, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., IMF SURVEILLANCE OVER CHINA’S EXCHANGE
RATE POLICY 40 (2007); see also MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CURRENCY
MANIPULATION AND ENFORCING THE RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 9 (2005).
84 Id. at 40.
85 Id. (emphasis in original).
86 Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, ‘Currency Manipulation’ and World Trade, 9 WORLD TRADE
REV. 583, 592 (2010). “The weak legal standards under Article IV, the emphasis on non-confrontational
consensus building within the IMF, and the absence of credible sanctions for disregarding IMF advice lead us
to doubt that the IMF can do much to influence the behavior of a member such as China.” Id. at 593.
82
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principles of the IMF, but there is no method for members to bring complaints
against other members.87 Second, there is significant reluctance on the part of
the IMF to reprimand member countries with no foreseeable need to borrow
money.88 Third, countries are able to successfully argue that their exchange
rate policies are not attempts to gain competitive trading advantages, but
simply mechanisms to stabilize the value of their currency and prevent
disruption in their domestic economy.89
Whatever the actual reason for the inaction, the reality remains that the
IMF is either unable or unwilling to use any power it might have to combat
currency manipulation.90 Thus, the IMF seems to cover issues related to
currency manipulation, but it does not present an adequate means of enforcing
violations.
B. WTO
The WTO presents another possible solution that differs from the IMF in a
number of ways. First, the WTO has a functioning dispute resolution system.91
Second, the WTO seemingly is gaining legitimacy and leverage while the IMF
is losing it.92 Finally, the WTO has enforcement capabilities.93 The one crucial
disadvantage of the WTO, however, is its lack of jurisdiction over exchange
rates.94 As one scholar summarized: “Though the IMF recognizes currency
manipulation as an unfair advantage, the IMF cannot currently undertake
enforcement actions against manipulating countries. Conversely, the WTO is
an active sanctioning body, but currently does not recognize currency
manipulation as grounds for recourse.”95

87

Mattoo & Subramanian, supra note 18, at 8.
See Staiger & Sykes, supra note 89, at 593.
89 JOSEPH E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL7-5700, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF AND
THE WTO 1–2 (2011).
90 Id. at 2; GAGNON, supra note 8, at 8.
91 Mattoo & Subramanian, supra note 18, at 8.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 8–9. These enforcement capabilities have had questionable effectiveness, but “[i]t is not
necessary that WTO dispute settlement be perfect. It is enough if it is an improvement on virtually nonexistent
enforcement in the IMF.” Id. at 9.
94 See id. at 5.
95 Archie, supra note 76, at 252–53.
88
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1. Violation of GATT
There are two methods by which the WTO can gain jurisdiction over
currency manipulation. First, to pursue a complaint in the WTO, a country
needs to show that the currency-manipulating country was in violation of
GATT.96 The intent of the GATT is to reduce barriers to trade and eliminate
“discriminatory treatment in international commerce.”97 Currency
manipulation distorts capital flows between countries and drains demand for
developed countries to the effect of over $1.5 trillion per year.98 Therefore,
currency manipulation would seemingly be a violation of the intent of GATT.
However, “frustrating the intent” of GATT might prove to be too vague a
standard for the WTO to rule against undervalued exchange rates.99
Moreover, the specific act of a country artificially inflating or deflating its
currency is not covered by WTO jurisdiction.100 Scholars have pointed out that
the “only provision of WTO law specifically relating to currency practices is to
be found in Article XV(4), concerning ‘exchange action’ that would ‘frustrate
the intent’ of GATT.”101 Taking action against a country for currency
manipulation would presumably have “major macroeconomic significance.”102
Thus, the WTO would probably need a stronger basis to rule on than the vague
“frustration of intent.”103
Another stumbling block to WTO jurisdiction is found in Article XV(2) of
the GATT. Article XV(2) of the GATT specifies the following, indicating that
currency manipulation issues belong to the IMF:
In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to
consider or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves,
balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements, they shall
consult fully with the International Monetary Fund. In such
consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all findings of
statistical and other facts presented by the Fund relating to foreign
96

Staiger & Sykes, supra note 86, at 586.
GATT, supra note 35, pmbl.
98 GAGNON, supra note 8, at 1, 3.
99 Mattoo & Subramanian, supra note 18, at 6.
100 See Haneul Jung, Tackling Currency Manipulation with International Law: Why and How Currency
Manipulation should be Adjudicated?, 9 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 184, 186 (2012) (“The WTO’s
silence on the issue of currency manipulation . . . may be regarded as the WTO’s passive surrender of
jurisdiction on the issue.”).
101 Staiger & Sykes, supra note 86, at 586.
102 Mattoo & Subramanian, supra note 18, at 9.
103 GATT, supra note 35, art. XV, sec. 4; see Mattoo & Subramanian, supra note 18, at 9–10.
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exchange, monetary reserves and balances of payments, and shall
accept the determination of the Fund as to whether action by a
contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or with
the terms of a special exchange agreement between that contracting
104
party and the CONTRACTING PARTIES.

Thus, bringing such a complaint in the WTO would present obvious
jurisdictional issues.105
2. Currency Manipulation as De Facto Trade Subsidy
Another method of getting WTO jurisdiction exists. This method would
require both creativity and good advocacy. A country would have to convince
a judge that currency manipulation presents an unfair de facto trade subsidy, as
it props up its own manufacturing interests.106 A country could thus employ the
WTO’s dispute resolution system by looking to the GATT’s language on
subsidies. Article XVI(1) of the GATT provides the following language
regarding unfair subsidies by member countries:
In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the
interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by any
such subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy shall,
upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or parties
concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES the possibility of
107
limiting the subsidization.

The largest obstacle to pursuing such a claim would be forcing currency
manipulation under the umbrella of “subsidies.”108 Again, for an issue of such
economic importance, it would be a significant challenge for a complaining
country to convince a judge to rule based on a creative definition. Additionally,
104

GATT, supra note 35, art. XV, sec. 2.
See Staiger & Sykes, supra note 86, at 607. Additionally, should the WTO rules be changed to address
currency issues, it could give rise to forum shopping between the IMF and the WTO. See Catharina E. Koops,
Manipulating the WTO? The Possibilities for Challenging Undervalued Currencies under WTO Rules,
(manuscript at 15), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564093.
106 The WTO definition of “subsidy” requires three elements: (i) a financial contribution; (ii) by a
government or any public body within the territory of a Member; (iii) which confers a benefit. Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures: Overview, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_
e.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). Often times the recipient of such a payment would lose money making the
product in the absence of such a subsidy. Whether or not a subsidy is unfair, however, probably depends on
advocacy and political power.
107 GATT, supra note 35, art. XVI, sec. 1.
108 Koops, supra note 105, at 4.
105

HOWARD GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

5/1/2014 9:15 AM

CHINESE CURRENCY MANIPULATION

1229

even if a devalued currency acts as a de facto subsidy for exports,109 no IMF or
WTO agreements explicitly state that currency manipulation can be treated as a
de jure subsidy.110 Thus, a complaining country would have to: 1) convince a
judge to make new international law; 2) change the rules of the WTO; or 3) get
the currency manipulating country to join in an agreement specifying that the
definition of illegal subsidies includes currency manipulation.111 Neither of
these requirements are likely attainable.112
Additionally, internal politics might prevent the WTO from providing an
adequate remedy to the problem. Although the 157 members of the WTO each
have a single vote in the election of officials, the powerful members like China
hold a great deal of influence.113 For example, in his attempt to become
director-general of the WTO, politician Herminio Blanco has made very
deferential statements related to China and the controversy over currency
devaluation.114 In an interview, Blanco stated that the WTO should not hold
that a country’s foreign-exchange rate policy amounted to an unfair trade
subsidy.115 Thus, wildly divergent views on the issue among the WTO’s
biggest powers seem guaranteed to prevent any resolutions. Additionally, such
a divisive issue could split the institution from within.116
C. IMF and WTO Cooperation
To resolve the enforcement issues of the IMF and the jurisdictional issues
of the WTO, a number of scholars have suggested that the organizations should
cooperate to combat currency manipulation.117 Under these scholars’
proposals, countries could file a complaint with the WTO, after which the
WTO would ask the IMF to decide on whether and to what degree currency
manipulation was occurring.118 If the IMF found a violation, then the WTO
would authorize the complainant to impose countervailing tariffs against the

109

It would likely be difficult to convince an impartial judge to make this classification.
See SANFORD, supra note 89, at 1–3.
111 Id. at 5–9.
112 Id. at 6, 8.
113 See JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW, AND ECONOMICS OF
THE GATT AND WTO 56 (2008).
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 55, at 6; see Irwin, supra note 5, at 30; Mattoo & Subramanian,
supra note 18, at 13.
118 GAGNON, supra note 8, at 8 (discussing the scholars’ proposals).
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offending country.119 One roadblock to such a procedure is that it would
require changing the WTO agreements, which require consensus,120 and the
IMF articles, which require approval from eighty-five percent of voting
shares.121 Additionally, countries that are manipulating currency (and
benefitting) might be hesitant to agree to such changes.
Scholars have floated various solutions for this problem. Some have
suggested a “plurilateral” approach, by which countries supporting restrictions
on currency manipulation form their own agreement outside the boundaries of
the WTO.122 Such an agreement might exert peer pressure on the worst
offenders, gradually winning support from countries like China and the United
States.123 Additionally, it might be possible to have bargains “in which
restrictions on currency manipulation will be balanced by other changes
desired by the countries that believe currency manipulation is an acceptable
trade practice.”124
However, achieving such a consensus might be impossible⎯or even
undesirable. One scholar notes that “few countries want the IMF to have the
kinds of power over their economies that it would need to compel violators [to]
comply with its rules.”125 If the IMF were able to force China to stop
manipulating its currency, it would have the power to regulate the euro or the
dollar as well.126 As the United States is arguably a currency manipulator
itself,127 empowering the IMF in such a way would necessarily and severely
handicap the sovereignty of the Federal Reserve.
Lastly, the leadership in the IMF and the WTO would have to consent to
such drastic overhaul. Large organizations usually hesitate to make great
changes without an imminent need. Therefore, the IMF and WTO are unlikely
to simultaneously relinquish their sovereignty to address a practice in which
the majority of their members engage.

119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

IMF).

Id.
Id.
See IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 41, art. 28(a).
See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 55, at 6.
Id. at 22.
SANFORD, supra note 89, at 14–38.
Id. at 5.
Id.
See id. at 1 (explaining that the United States devalued its dollar twice in 1971 without consulting the
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D. Summary
Two international organizations with large memberships, the WTO and the
IMF, regulate interstate trade and monetary interaction. The IMF seemingly
has a stronger jurisdictional basis for policing exchange rates but lacks
meaningful enforcement capabilities. The WTO has some enforcement
capability but has jurisdictional hurdles. Cooperation between the two
organizations would solve these major issues but is unlikely for a number of
reasons. Perhaps the best way to address the issue on an international scale
would be to form a new international organization, a possibility discussed in
Part V. While probably not the best or most effective way, the easiest and most
efficient way to address the issue is likely a unilateral action, discussed in Part
IV.
IV. UNILATERAL ACTIONS
In the absence of an international remedy, the United States could act
unilaterally in the domestic sphere. The United States could either enact new
legislation to try to combat the problem, or utilize existing legislation. The
United States remains the world’s economic superpower.128 In theory, it could
lean on a smaller country and force the smaller country to stop any competitive
currency devaluation that was harming manufacturers in the United States.
China is a different story. The United States is dependent upon China for both
imports and exports,129 and any serious disruptions of their relationship could
prove disastrous. Nevertheless, politicians regularly call for unilateral action by
the United States with no regard to the international community.130 A few of
the possibilities for action are presented below.

128 See Andrew Bergmann, World’s Largest Economies, CNN, http://money.cnn.com/news/economy/
world_economies_gdp/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2014). In 2012, the GDP of the United States was $15.7 trillion,
almost double the second leading economy in China, with a GDP of $8.3 trillion. Id.
129 See Foreign Trade, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/
top/top1212yr.html (last updated Aug. 6, 2013). China buys 7.1 percent of U.S. exports (third most by a single
country), and provides 18.7 percent of its imports (most by a single country). Id. Disruption of such a
relationship would take away a large market for goods produced in the United States, and deny U.S. citizens a
great number of the goods and prices they are accustomed to. See Mary Amiti & Mark Choi, Consumer Goods
from China Are Getting More Expensive, LIBERTY STREET ECON. (Sept. 7, 2011), http://
libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2011/09/consumer-goods-from-china-are-getting-more-expensive.html
130 See Hatch Press Release, supra note 52; see also O’Brien, supra note 1.
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A. Omnibus Act
One piece of existing legislation that the United States could employ to
address Chinese currency manipulation is the Omnibus Foreign Trade and
Competitive Act of 1988 (Omnibus Act).131 If the Secretary of the Treasury
finds a country to be manipulating its currency, the Omnibus Act provides that:
[S]uch manipulation is occurring with respect to countries that (1)
have material global current account surpluses; and (2) have
significant bilateral trade surpluses with the United States, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall take action to initiate negotiations
with such foreign countries on an expedited basis, in the International
Monetary Fund or bilaterally, for the purpose of ensuring that such
countries regularly and promptly adjust the rate of exchange between
their currencies and the United States dollar to permit effective
balance of payments adjustments and to eliminate the unfair
132
advantage.

The language above indicates that upon a finding of currency manipulation, the
Secretary of the Treasury has the authority either to initiate negotiations
directly with the offending country or to bring a complaint to the IMF.133 As
discussed earlier, bringing a complaint to the IMF is unlikely to be effective.
Similarly, a country that is benefiting from currency manipulation is unlikely
to freely negotiate away its sovereignty over its own currency, rendering
bilateral negotiations unhelpful.134 This is especially true in the case of ChinaUnited States relations, as there is an extreme incentive to cheat.135
In a bilateral agreement not to manipulate currency, neither party has much
incentive to obey the agreement.136 The short-term benefits of cheating are
much more recognizable than whatever negative consequences might
follow.137 Additionally, parties to such an agreement are unlikely to write in
any legitimate enforcement mechanisms.138 Perhaps parties could agree to have
131 Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitive Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified
as amended in scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.) [Omnibus Act].
132 22 U.S.C. § 5304. (2012).
133 C. RANDALL HENNING, ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT OF US EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 20 (2008).
134 See SANFORD, supra note 89, at 2.
135 See Palmer, supra note 10. When such high volumes are being traded, unexpected currency
devaluation could cost an unsuspecting trade partner dearly. See id. As soon as the victim nation detects the
manipulation, it can respond in kind, but the short-term harm may be significant, both to the victim’s economy
and to the trade relationship’s future. See id.
136 See SANFORD, supra note 89, at 6.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 5.
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any disputes arbitrated by a third party, but sovereignty concerns likely prevent
any such concessions by either party to a dispute.139 Thus, the only likely
agreement possible between two countries would be a sort of gentleman’s
agreement with more political benefit than actual substance.
Thus, since the Omnibus Act seemingly only authorizes the making of
ineffective IMF complaints or the initiation of ineffective bilateral
negotiations, relief must be sought elsewhere. One solution that has not only
been discussed, but attempted, is the imposition of tariffs.
B. Tariffs
The imposition of tariffs is of questionable legality.140 However, tariffs are
possibly justifiable countermeasures in response to currency manipulation by
other nations.141 Tariffs come in many varieties, but they fall into a few major
categories. The broadest type of tariff would be to charge a tax on all imports,
no matter the type or source of the goods.142 Tariffs like this would likely help
domestic manufacturing in the short term,143 but would probably result in a
reduced standard of living domestically in the long term.144 Additionally,
tariffs are generally seen as something to avoid,145 as they create inefficiencies

139

See id. at 6.
GATT, supra note 35, art. VIII, sec. 3; see also Jennifer Freedman, WTO Rules Chinese Tariffs on
U.S. Steel Products Are Illegal, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2012, 3:10 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-06-15/wto-rules-chinese-tariffs-on-u-s-steel-products-are-illegal.html.
141 See Robert E. Scott, Currency Manipulation- History Shows That Sanctions Are Needed, ECON.
POLICY INST. 1 (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/pm164/pm164.pdf; see also HENNING, supra
note 133, at 91–92. Countermeasures involve a country responding to a perceived illegal act by another
country. Id. at 91. Countermeasures are themselves illegal acts, but the illegality is precluded because it is a
response to an initial wrongful act. See id. at 92. Countermeasures must also be proportional. See id. at 92–93.
142 J. Bradford De Long, Trade Policy and America’s Standard of Living: an Historical Perspective 3
(Sept. 1995) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jlbroz/Courses/POLI142B/syllabus/
delong.pdf.
143 Tariffs add to the cost of imported goods, making domestically produced goods (unaffected by the
tariff) more competitive. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 86, at 597–98.
144 See De Long, supra note 145, at 5. In the short run there would be decreased unemployment and gains
in the manufacturing sector. See generally Per-Olov Johansson & Karl-Gustaf Löfgren, The Effects of Tarffs
and Real Wages on Employment in a Barro-Grossman Model of an Open Economy, 82 SCANDINAVIAN J.
ECON. 167 (1980). However, there would be negative tradeoffs, as the cheap goods that citizens had been
enjoying would either be more expensive or unavailable altogether, resulting in a loss of utility to consumers.
See De Long, supra, at 3, 5.
145 See Staiger & Sykes, supra note 86, at 602. Recent WTO talks have included discussion of tariff
reduction. “One result of the Uruguay Round was countries’ commitments to cut tariffs and to ‘bind’ their
customs duty rates to levels which are difficult to raise.” Tariffs, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tariffs_e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
140
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in the global market.146 For a country that is a net importer like the United
States,147 such universal tariffs are especially dangerous as domestic demand is
higher than domestic supply, which could bring real risks of inflation148 and,
accordingly, unhappy citizens.
Similar, but a little narrower in scope, would be a tariff on all goods from a
certain country. Such sanctions have been used successfully as punishment for
certain violations, but carry the same risks as the universal import tariffs
discussed above. This is especially true in the context of the United States
imposing an import tariff on China, a country that accounts for a very large
portion of its imports.149 Additionally, a country-specific tariff is likely the
quickest way to ignite retaliations and possibly an all-out trade war.
Much narrower in scope, and accordingly less risky, would be a sectorspecific tariff only targeting goods in a particular industry. The United States
has enacted such tariffs already as a response to devalued imports from
China.150 For instance, in recent years the Commerce Department has put
various restrictions on imports of goods.151 Most of these restrictions were
minor, and China “grumbled” but did little in response.152 This inaction is
probably due to the fact that the United States buys roughly 4.5 times as many
goods from China as China buys from the United States.153
However, China has not always sat idly in the face of such tariffs. Recently,
China retaliated in response to a particularly protectionist action by the United
States.154 In 2009, the United States instituted a tariff of thirty-five percent on

146

See Staiger & Sykes, supra note 88, at 597.
See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Int’l Trade in Goods & Servs. (Sept. 4, 2013), http://
www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/ft900.pdf.
148 See generally Beckington & Amon, supra note 17 (discussing the detriments of high tariffs).
149 Derek Scissors, Free Markets and National Defense: U.S. Import Dependence on China, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/free-markets-and-national-defenseus-import-dependence-on-china.
150 See Jonathan Weisman, U.S. to Impose Tariff on Chinese Tires, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2009) http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB125271824237605479.html (discussing sector-specific import tariffs).
151 Edmund L. Andrews & Edward Wong, China Denounces New Tire Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2009, at A1.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See id. (stating that China announced that it would investigate certain U.S. imports to determine
whether the important were “being subsidized or ‘dumped’ below the cost in the Chinese market).
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all Chinese passenger and light truck tire imports.155 Even assuming that this
tariff was legal under international law, at least one major issue remains; it
seems to have done more harm than good. One 2011 study has estimated that
the cost to Americans from higher prices resulting from safeguard tariffs on
Chinese tires was about $1.1 billion.156 Presumably, this loss of purchasing
power caused an indirect loss of jobs in the retail sector.157 Additionally, the
tire tariff inspired a retaliatory tariff by China on U.S. poultry exports,
resulting in a ninety percent decrease of exports from the United States to
China.158 Thus, in attempting to stop the perceived harm from underpriced tire
imports, the United States possibly inflicted more harm upon itself than was
inflicted by China’s imports.
Thus, tariffs are probably not an adequate solution for addressing Chinese
currency manipulation. Universal tariffs would likely cause more harm than
good, as the United States is dependent upon imports. Country-specific tariffs
might be effective, but carry significant risks of retaliation and trade-wars.
Industry-specific tariffs carry fewer risks but operate on such a smaller scale
that their ability to combat the problem is limited.
C. New Legislation
Currency manipulation has become a popular political talking point. Some
politicians in the United States have begun to grumble publicly about the issue.
For instance, in a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, Utah Senator Orrin
Hatch wrote:
I am writing to express my disappointment that the Obama
administration has once again failed to meet its statutory obligations
under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. As you
know, that law requires the Treasury to ‘consider whether countries
155 Guidance: Effective September 26, 35% Ad Valorem Duty on Chinese Tires for Passenger Cars, Light
Trucks, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/trade_
programs/entry_summary/laws/advalorem_chinese_tires.xml; see also Weisman, supra note 151.

Creating jobs in the American manufacturing sector and ensuring that China plays fair on the
international market are both worthy policy goals. Trade protection targeted at selected imports,
however, is a costly way of going about these tasks. Admittedly, targeted protection can be
highly popular with US trade unions and individual firms.
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & SEAN LOWRY, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., POLICY BRIEF NO. PB12-9, US
TIRE TARIFFS: SAVING FEW JOBS AT HIGH COST 14 (2012)
156 HUFBAUER & LOWRY, supra note 155, at 1.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 3.
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manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency and the U.S.
dollar for purpose of preventing effective balance of payment
adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international
159
trade’ and to report these findings annually by October 15th.

Hatch is technically correct in his statement, even if his statement does not
address that such findings are meaningless in the absence of a means to address
the problem. Regardless, his statement is significant because it shows that
politicians are at least thinking about addressing the issue domestically.
In a response to this perceived inability or lack of desire to institute
counter-measures against currency manipulation, politicians have fashioned
proposed bills and amendments, such as the Currency Reform for Fair Trade
Act, a bill that never made it to a vote.160 A 2010 bill proposed by Senator
Charles Schumer would have either repealed the relevant provisions of the
1988 Omnibus Act or superseded the Act, and would have reduced much of
the procedure that blocks the United States from unilaterally acting against
Chinese currency manipulation.161 None of these bills have passed; instead,
most simply died in committee.162
The saying “the squeaky wheel gets the grease” applies to politics. The
people that complain the loudest about their problems are usually the ones who
are tended to by politicians. Also, issues perceived to be urgent receive
attention more quickly. The people most likely to complain about Chinese
currency manipulation are workers (and worker unions) in industries
particularly harmed by the practice.163 Thus, it is far more likely that any
politician, moved to respond to this problem, simply proposes a sector-specific
fix, instead of a broader response to the overall practice.164
This fix, even if it gets through the gridlock in Congress, would likely not
be broad enough to combat the overall issue. Additionally, it seems that there
are always issues screaming louder for attention than a complex issue like
159

Hatch Press Release, supra note 51.
See S. 328: Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act & H.R. 639: Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act,
ECON. CRISIS, http://economyincrisis.org/s-328-currency-reform-for-fair-trade-act-h-r-639-currency-reformfor-fair-trade-act.
161 Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2010 S. 3134, 11th Cong. (2010).
162 Bill Summary & Status: 11th Congress (2009–2010): S.3134, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: THOMAS, http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.3200: (last visited Jan. 5, 2014).
163 See HUFBAUER & LOWRY, supra note 155, at 1–2 (discussing how the tire industry successfully
lobbied for the tire tariff in 2009).
164 See Derek Scissors, U.S.- China Trade: Do’s and Don’ts for Congress, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 20,
2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/07/us-china-trade-dos-and-donts-for-congress.
160
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currency manipulation that people struggle to understand.165 Whether due to a
budget crisis, debt ceiling crisis, or social equality crisis, currency
manipulation would probably get bumped to the bottom of the agenda.
D. Import Quotas
If the United States were convinced that there were no acceptable
resolutions possible through international forums, a much more drastic solution
is available. The United States could theoretically institute a strict import-quota
on Chinese goods (or a tariff-rate quota), whereby only a very limited number
of underpriced exports were allowed to come in.166 Such a solution would not
only deprive United States citizens of imported goods that they are accustomed
to and lower their standard of living, but it would, like any other unilateral
actions, likely elicit retaliation from China or even a trade war. Most
significantly, however, import quotas are prohibited by GATT. Article XIII of
GATT provides that:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party or on the exportation of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the
like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like
167
product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted.

Thus, to remain in compliance with the WTO, the United States would need to
erect the same restrictions against all other member countries that it instituted
against China. An import quota or restriction would likely cause more harm
than good, and is not an adequate solution.
E. Conclusion
The United States should not unilaterally implement sanctions, duties, or
tariffs, for a number of reasons. First, such actions are arguably illegal under

165 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Want Congress, Obama to Tackle Economic Issues, GALLUP
POL. (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/145592/americans-congress-obama-tackle-economic-issues.
aspx (discussing the most important issues that American citizens want their Congressional representatives to
address; foreign currency manipulation is not among these issues).
166 See generally Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on the Accession
of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 14 (Oct. 1, 2001) (discussing the option and legality of tariff-rate quotas);
Absolute vs. Tariff Rate Quotas, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/
detail/a_id/9/~/absolute-vs.-tariff-rate-quotas (last updated July 25, 2013).
167 GATT, supra note 35, art. XIII.
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international law.168 Second, the United States also manipulates its currency,169
so the lack of clean hands might cause other nations to react negatively. Third,
any corrective actions create risk of retaliation,170 and such risks are spread out
and likely minimized in the face of a coalition. Fourth, the effectiveness of
corrective actions is uncertain, but a coalition would likely be more effective
than unilateral actions. Fifth, an international consensus prohibiting currency
manipulation would present more benefit and less risk than attempting to
correct every new instance that arises.
V. INTERNATIONAL COALITION
This article proposes that if the United States wants to fight currency
manipulation, it should only be as a member of a coalition. Instead of
spearheading the drive for sanctions or tariffs, the United States should
spearhead the creation of an international currency-monitoring agency
(hypothetically called the “ICMA”). The United States has acted as sole
international policeman for decades, and the costs have started to catch up in
the form of trillions of dollars of national debt.171 The international community
has recently proven that it can be effective and produce favorable results even
when the United States takes less of a leadership role and instead relies on the
strength of the group.172
A. What Would It Take to Form Such An Agency?
The best possible scenario for combating currency manipulation would be a
scenario similar to the post-World War II period. Having seen the destruction
caused by competitive currency manipulation, the international community
realized the need for a prohibition of such tactics.173 If the international
community today could reach the same conclusion, the development of an
168

Staiger & Sykes, supra note 88, at 606–16.
Paul R. La Monica, China Isn’t the Only Currency ‘Manipulator,’ CNN MONEY (Oct. 6, 2011, 1:24
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/06/news/economy/thebuzz/index.htm.
170 See id.
171 In 2011, the cost of just the wars after September 11, 2001, had reached at least $4 trillion. Estimated
Cost of Post-9/11 Wars: 225,000 Lives, up to $4 Trillion, BROWN U. (June 29, 2011), http://news.brown.edu/
pressreleases/2011/06/warcosts.
172 Although there are obvious differences between military action and economic actions, the coalition
against Libya during the Arab Spring saw the United States take a more passive role and still produced the
desired result, with much of the cost being assumed by other states, instead of predominantly by the United
States (as with Iraq). See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (approving humanitarian
intervention in Libya).
173 Beckington & Amon, supra note 17, at 218.
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adequate policing agency might be possible. Under the current regime, a nation
has to bring a complaint174 or take unilateral corrective actions whenever it has
suffered domestically.175 Self-interested actions inherently have a higher
standard to meet in seeking legitimacy.
On the other hand, if currency manipulation was an aberration instead of
the norm, and the international community coalesced around the need for
stable exchange rates, any corrective actions would have a great deal of
legitimacy. Refusing to cooperate with judgments or guidelines established by
the ICMA would bring at least two negative consequences: 1) heavy fines,
penalties, tariffs, etc., or 2) delegitimizing the ICMA and ensuring that
neighboring countries will retaliate with their own currency devaluation, a sort
of economic mutually assured destruction. Establishment of an agency like the
ICMA would take a global consensus on the issue of currency manipulation.
B. Outlook
Unfortunately, recent discussion about currency manipulation has not been
promising.176 Regulation of currency manipulation may have a serious
problem: even if every country agreed that currency manipulation is harmful,
countries still have an incentive to cheat and to engage in their own currency
manipulation.177 From a strictly economic perspective, countries will not make
a policy change unless they can see potential benefits from the change. Any
country that unilaterally decides to stop devaluing their currency would almost
immediately see the value of its currency rise, its current account deficit
increase, and its export levels harmed.178 Especially if the leadership of such a
country is popularly elected, such a unilateral change is extremely unlikely.
Similarly, it would be exceedingly difficult to get a large number of
countries to agree to such an arrangement. The only countries that would be
likely to agree to a prohibition on currency manipulation would be those
countries who are not engaging in currency manipulation, would not benefit
174

See SANFORD, supra note 89, at 2.
See supra notes 140–58, and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., Jennifer Ryan & Scott Hamilton, King Sees Risk of More Currency Management as
Imbalances Persist, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-10/
king-sees-risk-of-more-exchange-rate-management-amid-imbalances.html.
177 See Nicholas Hastings, G-20 Brings Currency War One Step Closer, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323495104578311681662780890.html.
178 See Annalyn Censky, What is Currency Manipulation, Anyhow?, CNN (Nov. 11, 2010), http://money.
cnn.com/2010/11/10/news/economy/what_is_currency_manipulation/index.htm#. Although, these are just
general assumptions, plenty vulnerable to criticism.
175

HOWARD GALLEYSPROOFS2

1240

5/1/2014 9:15 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

from such manipulation, and are unafraid of political fallout from ceding
sovereignty over their currencies. This difficulty has proven formidable in
recent days.
Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, has actually cautioned
that countries may begin implementing currency management even more in the
coming years.179 King stated in an interview that his “concern is that in 2013
we’ll see the growth of actively managed exchange rates as an alternative to
the use of domestic monetary policy.”180 In a recent meeting of the Group of
Twenty, which includes industrialized and developing countries (G-20), Japan
expected to be chastised for its recent monetary policy.181 Japan has seen its
currency drop to a three-year low relative to the dollar.182 Instead of criticizing
Japan, however, the G-20 “decided to side step the issue given the number of
other countries that continue to pursue polices that will ultimately weaken their
currencies too.”183
C. Conclusion
The stable exchange rates in the three decades from 1940 to 1970 only
arose because of the shock to the system caused by the Great Depression.184
Countries realized that short-term self-interest actually caused long-term
destruction, both to themselves and to the international community.185 It is
unlikely that lessons have been learned, and popularly elected legislators and
autocratic dictators will look to the lessons of the past seven decades. It is far
more likely countries will continue to use exchange rates in dangerous ways
until they are forced to stop. However, of all the possible solutions to
competitive currency manipulation, forming a new international agency
combines the highest effectiveness with the least risk.
VI. OTHER CONCERNS
In the event that no corrective actions prove possible or adequate, perhaps
all is not lost. Inaction may actually prove better than action. As the
appreciation of the RMB is not certain to provide much meaningful benefit in
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Ryan & Hamilton, supra note 176.
Id.
Hastings, supra note 177.
Id.
Id.
See Beckington & Amon, supra note 17, at 218.
Id.
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the short-term, perhaps the best policy would be to avoid corrective actions
that may result in repercussions. As Secretary of the Treasury Timothy
Geithner told Congress in 2010, “Renminbi appreciation will not erase our
global trade deficit, nor our deficit with China. Our bilateral trade deficit is
likely to persist.”186
Geithner’s acknowledgement that RMB appreciation will not entirely erase
current account deficits might be incomplete; such appreciation might have no
impact at all, or even drive the current account deficit even higher.187 An
appreciating RMB could actually cause foreign investment in China to drop,
possibly causing China’s surplus to grow even more.188
A. Would Appreciation of the RMB Matter?
A study done by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) confirmed that the relationship between exchange rates
and trade balances was not a simple cause and effect, and that the “the main
driver of trade flows is found to be income—which is specified as domestic
income . . . Increases in income in China, in particular, have implied large
changes in trade with its partners.”189 Between 2007 and 2011, the IMF
estimated that a surge in domestic investment in China played as large a role as
real appreciation of the RMB did in the reduction of China’s current account
surplus.190
Thus, it is far from certain that an instantaneous appreciation of the RMB to
“natural levels” would even provide much benefit for the weakened economies
of the United States or Europe.191 Even with generous assumptions, numbers
from a recent OECD report show that RMB appreciation would not “fix” our

186 Press Release, Testimony, Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner Before the Senate Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs and House Ways and Means Committees (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.treasury.
gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg858.aspx. He did, however add the following: “But Chinese exchange
rate adjustment is critical to removing a major distortion in the global economy, to rebalancing China’s
economy, and to ensuring strong, sustainable, and balanced global growth.” Id.
187 Ronald McKinnon, China’s Exchange Rate Policy and Fiscal Expansion, STANFORD INST. ECON.
POL’Y RES. (Mar. 2009), http://siepr.stanford.edu/publicationsprofile/1901; Huchet-Bourdon & Korinek, supra
note 19, at 21.
188 See McKinnon, supra note 187.
189 Huchet-Bourdon & Korinek, supra note 19, at 21.
190 Alan Beattie & Alice Ross, International Trade: A Fragile Armistice, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2012), http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/49dd4646-0d47-11e2-97a1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2BOZVvmgL.
191 See Huchet-Bourdon & Korinek, supra note 19, at 4.
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deficit problems.192 The report found that even one of the more generous
models only produced an improvement of the 2008 U.S. agricultural trade
surplus of $4.7 billion and a decrease of the US manufacturing deficit of $30.8
billion.193 These numbers might seem large but would only represent a
decrease of the bilateral deficit by thirteen percent, from $270 billion to $235
billion.194
Even more importantly, these results were produced under one of the
models most generous to the basic assumptions about the link between
currency rates and trade.195 Contradictory empirical models produced far more
minimal (or even reverse!) results.196 Thus, it is far from certain that “fixing”
the problem of Chinese currency manipulation would even help reduce the
bilateral deficit with China.
It is important to realize however, that while policing one country’s
currency manipulation may or may not have any visible benefits, a stable
exchange-rate climate is highly desirable. Reduced risk of “currency wars” and
higher predictability allow for higher rates of investor confidence, a necessary
factor in economic growth.197
B. Risk of Retaliation
While there is the potential that cracking down on currency manipulation
could either prevent manufacturing jobs from leaving the United States, or
even bring back jobs that have been lost, it could also result in only marginal
significance and could potentially cost the United States dearly. For instance,
analysis of counter-measures like the tire tariff has shown that such measures
affected the U.S. job market and caused China to retaliate against the United
States poultry industry.198
This type of tit-for-tat retaliation could bloom into a full-scale trade war,
which would benefit neither country, especially in the setting of such global
economic suffering.199 Also up for debate is whether “normalized” exchange

192
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194
195
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197
198
199

See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 7, 8, 14, 15.
See id. at 17.
Id. at 6.
Hufbauer & Lowry, supra note 155, at 1.
Bacchus, supra note 1.
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rates could even marginally help the United States recover manufacturing jobs
lost to China, or whether it is a problem due mostly to differences in cost of
labor, likely to persist as developing countries now have nearly unlimited
access to the global economy.200 Additionally, while employment obviously
needs to rise in the United States, the jobs that could be reclaimed from China
are likely of the very low income, low quality of life variety.
C. Risk of Ostracizing China
Putting additional pressure on China through the WTO could also result in
its withdrawal from the WTO altogether, another extremely undesirable result.
Losing China would hurt the legitimacy of the WTO, as it would be losing one
of the largest players in the global economy.201 It would also harm the
countries that have benefitted from increased standard of living due to less
expensive imports.
China has lost multiple cases in the WTO in recent years,202 and its
leadership may be faced with a discussion on whether the benefits of free trade
outweigh the changes it must make to conform to the WTO’s rules. It is
possible that adding to a string of defeats for China in international disputes
might turn the perception of WTO membership from a positive one to a
negative one.203 Continually being on the losing end of disputes lends to the
perception that the system is unfair and could cause China to question its WTO
membership.
Additionally, some commentators have suggested that China might have no
intention of abiding by WTO rulings, hoping to maintain the status quo by
playing procedural games.204 Giving lip service to obeying judgments, while

200

Huchet-Bourdon & Korinek, supra note 19, at 4, 20.
Ashvin Ahuja et al., An End to China’s Imbalances? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
WP/12/100, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12100.pdf.
202 See, e.g., Dispute Settlement, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds394_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2013); see also
Kanaga Raja, WTO Upholds Ruling Against China in Raw Materials Dispute, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Feb.
1, 2012), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2012/twninfo120206.htm.
203 Time to Reassess Unfair WTO Entry Terms, GLOBAL TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012, 12:48 AM), http://www.
globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/694054/Time-to-reassess-unfair-WTO-entry-terms.aspx (“The latest WTO
ruling has highlighted the urgency of amending some of the unfair terms of The Protocol of China’s Entry into
the WTO. It is also necessary to express China’s dissatisfaction and garner public support for the revision.”).
204 Dan Harris, Another China WTO Loss. Another Nail in The Coffin of World Trade, CHINA L. BLOG
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2012/02/another_china_wto_loss_another_nail_in_the_coffin_
of_world_trade.html.
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having no intentions to actually act on those judgments, would allow China to
“free-ride” and receive the benefits of free trade without any sacrifice.205 In
such a scenario, a WTO complaint might not have any effect.
D. Mootness
The discussions about whether China’s currency manipulation derives from
a benign purpose and what enforcement mechanisms should be employed
seemingly have more questions than answers. Chinese currency manipulation
may also be a moot point. In October 2012, the RMB had appreciated two
percent against the dollar for three consecutive months, hitting a nineteen-year
high.206 Attempts to explain the RMB’s appreciation against the dollar vary.207
Chinese officials might be letting the RMB appreciate to blunt inflation
possibly resulting from the U.S. Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing policies,
or they might be attempting to maintain stability in times of economic
turmoil.208
Whatever the reasons, however, the fact remains: China appears, for the
time being, to not be a currency manipulator. Paul Krugman notes that political
posturing about Chinese currency manipulation is outdated, writing that “this is
an odd time to be making confrontation over China’s currency a centerpiece of
your economic policy—unless, of course, it’s just bluster aimed at making
voters think you’re tough.”209
However, even if China has currently stopped manipulating its currency, it
may start again.210 Additionally, other nations are currently engaging in
competitive currency devaluation, and the same legal frameworks apply to
countries like Hungary and Japan.211 States in the European Union are
presumably under another level of regulation by the European Central Bank,
but the Great Recession has seen currency manipulation at unprecedented
levels in Europe too.212
205

Id.
Simon Rabinovitch, Renminbi Hits 19-year High Against Dollar, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/db89f18e-1422-11e2-8260-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2BOZVvmgL.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Paul Krugman, An Issue Whose Time Has Passed, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Oct.
22, 2012, 12:58 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/22/an-issue-whose-time-has-passed.
210 O’Brien, supra note 1.
211 Michael Steen, Weidmann Warns of Currency War Risk, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013, 6:27 PM)
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d1d81962-63e7-11e2-b92c-00144feab49a.html#axzz2Ii5qRqPr.
212 See GAGNON, supra note 8, at 7.
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E. Changing Politics
There are concerns and counter-arguments that could change the scenario.
The Chinese government could undergo a radical policy shift in the event that
the makeup of the Standing Committee changes in 2012.213 A conservative
takeover could result in a change in policies as fundamental as the scale and
scope of governmental control over the economy.214 A governmental shift
could either attract new waves of investment in China, or it could drive
investors away in droves.
The existing instability in China’s economy215 could also play a major role.
If the Chinese economy falters, it would likely cause foreign investors and
capital to fly out of the country, reducing the current account surplus.216 On the
contrary, should the Chinese manufacturing industry continue to grow and the
European or American crisis worsen, China might become even more of a safe
haven for investors’ money.217
The flight of manufacturing jobs from China to other neighboring countries
with low labor costs could also affect the situation. China could be hit by the
“middle income trap,” with growth being driven by higher productivity, rather
than by resources and cheap labor.218 Manufacturing wages in China have risen
by about sixteen percent per year over the last decade, outstripping
productivity.219 China’s current path appears unsustainable, and the problem of
underpriced exports may yet fix itself.
F. Continuing Significance of the Issue
This Comment should not be read as stating that trade imbalances are
trivial or inconsequential. The risk persists that continued currency devaluation
could help China increase its market shares in manufacturing industries even

213 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, China’s Economic Destiny in Doubt After Leadership Shock, TELEGRAPH
(Nov. 4, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/9654300/
Chinas-economic-destiny-in-doubt-after-leadership-shock.html.
214 See generally id.
215 Evans-Pritchard, supra note 213.
216 See generally Hutchet-Bourdon & Korinek, supra note 19, at 6.
217 See id.
218 Running Out of Steam, ECONOMIST (Dec. 22, 2011, 12:04 AM) http://www.economist.com/blogs/
dailychart/2011/12/asias-middle-income-trap (“As wages rise manufacturers often find themselves unable to
compete in export markets with lower-cost producers elsewhere; yet they still find themselves behind the
advanced economies in higher-value products.”).
219 Evans-Pritchard, supra note 213.
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more, which would in turn increase its pricing power and threaten jobs not just
in the United States, but across the globe. Additionally, a reduction of the trade
deficit may be helpful (or even necessary) for the United States to see a rapid
recovery domestically.220
Most importantly, though, a “currency war” could prove to be disastrous in
an already fragile global economy. The President of Germany’s Bundesbank,
Jens Weidmann, recently cautioned that “erosion of central bank independence
around the world threatens to unleash a round of competitive exchange rate
devaluations.”221 Noting recent interventions by governments in Hungary and
Japan into central bank affairs, Weidmann stated that this may lead to an
“increased politicisation of the exchange rate,” which could trigger a round of
competitive devaluations.222 Such a result could be disastrous.223
VII. SUMMARY AND SOLUTION
China systematically devalued its currency in the 1990s and 2000s. This
devaluation policy appears to have, at least temporarily, stopped. The
devaluation policy played a role of undetermined significance in China running
up a large trade surplus while the United States accumulated a large trade
deficit. This trade imbalance likely had some impact on the number of jobs that
were lost in the United States during the “Great Recession.”224
The IMF and the WTO, by themselves, do not appear to present a method
of policing this currency manipulation. If the IMF and the WTO were to
cooperate, they might be able to regulate currency manipulation. However,
such cooperation would likely require the rules of both organizations to
change, and the votes necessary to effectuate such changes would likely prove
difficult to acquire.
220 Josh Bivens, Not Dead Yet: Currency Management and the Need for a More Competitive Dollar,
ECON. CRISIS (Oct. 29, 2012), http://economyincrisis.org/content/not-dead-yet-currency-management-and-theneed-for-a-more-competitive-dollar.

We need a lower value of the dollar to reduce our trade deficit, and reducing our trade deficit is
the only way we can have a rapid recovery over the medium-run without running larger budget
deficits. Given that the politics of the day have (stupidly, but clearly) ruled out larger budget
deficits, addressing the over-valued dollar is key.”
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Additionally, targeting currency manipulation might only have a marginal
effect on existing trade imbalances. The United States should, instead of
pursuing unilateral actions or trying to spearhead a multilateral agreement on
the subject, focus on reinventing its economy domestically. If the international
community decides that currency manipulation is a problem requiring a
resolution, being a follower instead of a leader would prove far less costly and
present far less risk of retaliation.
Unfortunately, it appears that there is no solution to the problem of Chinese
currency manipulation. Getting a country to stop manipulating its currency is
like getting a country to stop polluting. First, implementing such a change is
expensive. Second, even if the country were to unilaterally change, the other
nations around the world would still engage in the practice and the negative
externalities would persist. Third, partly due to expenses, partly due to
sovereignty concerns, and partly due to differences between developed and
developing countries, achieving a multilateral or international agreement on
the issue would be exceedingly difficult.225
It might take a shock to the system in order to obtain the necessary support
for ending currency manipulation. In the case of pollution and climate change,
such a shock would likely mean that the damage was already done and no
solutions could prevent the coming disaster. Hopefully, the same scenario
would not occur as it relates to currency manipulation, and this Great
Recession does not turn into another Depression.
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